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In this pre-registered study, we tried to replicate the study by
Rigoni et al. 2013 Cognition 127, 264–269. In the original
study, the authors manipulated the participants’ belief in free
will in a between-subject design and subsequently measured
post-error slowing (i.e. slower responses after an incorrect
trial compared with a correct trial) as a marker of cognitive
control. They found less post-error slowing in the group with
reduced belief in free will (anti-free will group) compared
with a control group in which belief in free will was not
manipulated. In the present study, we used the same task
procedure and the same free will manipulation (Crick text) in
an attempt to replicate these findings. However, we used an
online procedure and a larger sample size in order to
address concerns about statistical power. Similar to the
original study, we also used a questionnaire to measure
beliefs in free will as an independent manipulation check. We
found a difference in the scores on the questionnaire, thus a
reduced belief in free will, after reading the Crick text.
However, we did not find any difference in post-error
slowing between the anti-free will and control groups. Our
findings are in line with several other recent findings
suggesting that the Crick text manipulation affects the
participants’ self-reported belief in free will but not their
behaviour. The present study can be considered a high-





Exerting self-regulation is considered crucial to resist immediate temptationsandfulfil long-termgoals instead.
In the cognitive domain, researchers often refer to ‘cognitive control’ as part of self-regulatorymechanisms (for
a review of various ‘regulation’ and ‘control’ concepts in psychology, and how these are related, see [1]). One
important aspect of cognitive control is the monitoring of ongoing actions and the adjustment of task
parameters and settings when required [1–3]. An often-cited example of action monitoring and subsequent
control adjustments is the so-called post-error slowing (PES), which refers to response slowing after an error
has been committed. PES has been observed across a wide range of behavioural laboratory tasks, and
failures to make adjustments after errors or suboptimal outcomes have been associated with a wide range of
psychopathological symptoms and behavioural problems [4,5]. Therefore, PES has become an important
marker to study control of flexible and goal-directed behaviour. In the present study, we aimed to replicate
a study by Rigoni et al. [6], who showed that PES is influenced by the participants’ belief in free will.
According to traditional cognitive-control accounts, PES is a consequence of response-threshold
adjustments after an error in order to reduce subsequent errors [2,7–9]. However, some studies found that
response slowing is not necessarily associated with an increase in response accuracy [10–12]. This finding is
inconsistent with the widespread idea that PES is due to cognitive-control adjustments. To reconcile these
findings, recent ‘adaptive orienting’ accounts [9] propose that the slowing after errors can be due to two
different mechanisms, depending on the timescale of events. Immediately after the (usually infrequent)
error is committed, attention is oriented away from the main task; when the next trial is presented soon
after that, responding will be slowed down but accuracy will be lower (due to the need to reorient attention)
[13]. But when sufficient time is available (i.e. when the interval between consecutive trials is long enough),
control adjustments can be made, resulting in longer response latencies and higher accuracy.
Interestingly, research suggests that these post-error adjustments can bemodulated by individuals’ beliefs
about their ability to control theirown thoughts andactions [14–17]. Belief in freewill is an inherentpropertyof
theWesternmoral and social culture, aswell as theWestern judicial system [18]. However, such beliefs are not
static, and might be altered when confronted with e.g. novel information. For example, Rigoni et al. [6]
manipulated participants’ belief in free will, and investigated how this influenced PES. In their experiment,
there were two sessions. In the first session (the baseline session), participants filled out a questionnaire
assessing their belief in free will (the ‘Free Will and Determinism scale plus’ or ‘FAD plus’; [19]) and then
performed a Simon task in which PES was measured. In the second session (which took place a week after
the first session), participants were divided into a control group and an anti-free will group. Both groups
read a text from The astonishing hypothesis by Francis Crick [20]. The control group read a part about
consciousness, whereas the anti-free will group read a part stating that scientists found out that free will
does not exist [20]. After reading the text (i.e. the experimental manipulation), participants again completed
the FAD plus and performed the Simon task in which PES was measured. The pre–post-manipulation
differences in PES size and FAD plus scores were calculated, and compared between the groups. Rigoni
and colleagues found that reading the anti-free will text reduced both belief in free will (as measured by the
FAD plus) and post-error adjustments (as indicated by reduced PES). These results were interpreted as
evidence for the idea that reduced belief in free will reduces motivation to exert self-regulation, including
performance adjustments after erroneous responses. This finding could have important implications for
how societies deal with (perceived) behavioural control problems [21]. For example, certain externalizing
behaviours (e.g. attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and substance use disorder) are now understood in
some societies as neurological disorders, best treated with medications. This raises fundamental questions
about volition and responsibility (disease versus lifestyle choice). The findings by Rigoni et al. suggest that
reduced beliefs about free will (volition and responsibility) can influence further self-regulation. Thus, how
societies define (perceived) control problems could influence how individuals self-regulate their behaviour.
In a follow-up study, the same group demonstrated that a neural marker of error monitoring was also
influenced by the free will belief manipulation [22]. Specifically, the amplitude of the error-related negativity,
a purported neural marker of error detection in electroencephalography (EEG) measurements, was mitigated
under the condition of reduced belief in free will. However, the behavioural effect (i.e. reduced PES in the
anti-free will group) could not be replicated. Moreover, a new meta-analysis [23] conducted by some of the
authors of the current paper indicates that the manipulation of the belief in free will reduces scores on
several questionnaires (measuring the belief in free will); however, the overall effect size on free will beliefs is
very small, g= 0.31 (152 outcomes from 119 studies, calculated using robust variance estimation). This leads
to the assumption that the study by Rigoni et al. [6] might constitute a false positive result.
Therefore, the aim of this study was to directly replicate the behavioural findings of Rigoni et al. [6],
as this study suggests that free will beliefs seem to also influence cognitive-control processes.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journa
3We pre-registered the entire procedure (https://osf.io/kmpdh) and uploaded all experimental and
analyses scripts on OSF (https://osf.io/3nxpg/), and followed the original procedure as much as
possible. Therefore, we used the Simon task to measure PES and the Crick [20] text to manipulate belief
in free will. In order to address the possible power problem of the original study, we decided to test this
replication in a large online sample and follow a Bayesian sampling plan. However, for practical reasons
in online testing, we did not have two test sessions as in the original study. Instead, we had only one
session that consisted of (i) a baseline phase (in which we measured PES), (ii) the experimental
manipulation phase (i.e. reading the text), and (iii) a post-manipulation phase (in which we measured
PES and belief in free will). Moreover, we used the free will inventory (FWI) [24] instead of the FAD
plus, as the FWI has been established as the preferred scale to measure free will beliefs [25]. We




Fourhundredparticipants (200per group, recruitedviaProlific.co) completed the entire onlineexperimentand
were included in the analyses (164 females and 4 who preferred to not indicate their gender; age
M ¼ 23:3 years, s.d.¼ 4:8 years; range ¼ 1848). All participants identified themselves as students in order
to keep the sample as similar as possible to the original study. Only participants who were able to speak
English were allowed to participate. Participants agreed to the consent form before starting the experiment.
In addition to the 400 participants who completed the experiment, an additional 113 participants
finished the experiment and got paid but were excluded from data analyses in accordance to the pre-
registered exclusion criteria. First, to check whether participants actually read the manipulation text,
we included two yes/no-questions at the end of the study (see https://osf.io/3nxpg/); participants
who failed to answer both questions correctly and took less than 45 s to read the text were excluded
(N = 55; 16 in the control group and 39 in the manipulation group). Second, participants with very
low accuracy across congruent and incongruent trials in the baseline Simon task (more than 2.5
standard deviations (s.d.) below the overall sample average in the respective condition) were excluded
(N = 29). Third, we excluded 21 participants with missing or incomplete datasets due to technical
problems (i.e. data were not recorded, probably related to poor Internet connection). Fourth, we
excluded seven participants who did not have enough trials for all conditions (see below for further
information on trial exclusion criteria). In addition to the pre-registered criteria, we excluded one
participant who used the wrong response keys during the whole experiment. In order to reach the
predetermined sample size and Bayes factors, all excluded participants were replaced. This data-
replacement procedure was pre-registered. Five additional datasets were rejected (not paid and
therefore immediately replaced) due to low effort responses (accuracy at guessing level (50%) and
very short response time (less than 100 ms)) and too short completion times. Finally, an additional 109
participants signed up for the experiment but never started or completed it. This seems to be a
common procedure on Prolific in order to ‘reserve’ a spot in a better paid experiment. All included
datasets, as well as the excluded datasets and the five rejected datasets can be found on the OSF
(https://osf.io/3nxpg/). In this OSF repository, we also included a more detailed explanation of the
Bayesian sampling and the replacement procedures.
All data were acquired between 3 February and 5 March 2020. Participants had to enter their
nationality manually, as this ensured that no bots could complete the task.
2.2. Sample size
We set a minimum sample size of 100 participants per group and a maximal sample size of 200
participants per group (so 400 participants in total). To determine our sample size, we used
sequential Bayesian hypothesis testing (see Analyses section for further details) by increasing the
sample in steps of 50 participants (25 per group) until a decisive Bayes factor (BF larger than 10 or
smaller than 1/10) was obtained [26], or until we reached the maximum number of 400 participants.
We calculated the BF based on the ANOVA with test phase as within-subject factor and group as
between-subject factor. The difference score between pre- and post-error reaction time as calculated
with the Dutilh et al. [27] method (see below) was our main dependent variable, and therefore, used




4latency, unlike the traditional method used in the original study. The minimum sample size (100 per
group or 200 in total) was based on recommendations by Brysbaert [28] for a standard two-way
ANOVA with one within-subject factor, one between-subject factor, and with r = 0.90 (i.e. the
correlation between the within-subject variables) [28].
2.3. Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was programmed in jsPsych (v. 6.0.5), which has a comparable accuracy in response times
measurements to standard lab software like Psychophysics Toolbox and E-Prime [29]. The experiment only
ran on desktop computers and laptops, with Chrome or Mozilla Firefox installed (the experiment usually
runs without any problems in these two browsers [29]). Keyboards were used to register responses.
Participants had to respond to the colour of a circle (blue or yellow) by pressing a left or right key. We
kept the S-R mapping the same across all participants with the ‘r’ key assigned to the yellow circle and
the ‘p’ key assigned to the blue circle. Note that the colours in the original study were green and red,
but in order to avoid problems for colour blind participants, we used blue and yellow here. The circles
appeared either on the left or the right side of the screen, but the stimulus location was irrelevant.
Therefore, there were trials in which the response key and the location of the stimulus matched
(congruent trials; i.e. left side on the screen and left response key, or right side on the screen and right
response key), and trials on which the response key and location did not match (incongruent trials; i.e.
left side of the screen and right response key, or right side on the screen and left response key). The
colour and stimulus location were pseudo-randomized within subjects (equal probability of all
combinations; i.e. yellow left location, yellow right location, blue left location and blue right location).
2.4. Procedure
The general procedure started with welcoming the participant, asking for consent, requesting information
about age, gender (with the options ‘male’, ‘female’ and ‘I don’t want to say’) and nationality, and
explaining the experimental procedure. The proper experiment consisted of three main phases.
In the first phase (the baseline phase), participants performed the Simon task. In accordance with the
original code provided by the first author of the original study [6], first a fixation cross was presented for
500ms, after which the stimulus (a blue- or yellow-coloured circle) was presented. The stimulus
remained on the screen until the participant’s response. The next trial started immediately after the
response (i.e. there was no feedback or extra inter-trial interval). In total, participants completed a
practice block with 16 trials and four experimental blocks with 96 trials each. We tested this Simon
task procedure in a pilot study (N = 40) and observed the expected PES (Hedge’s gav = 1.6). The data
and the code of this pilot experiment are made available as well (https://osf.io/3nxpg).
In the second phase (the manipulation phase), participants read a passage from The astonishing
hypothesis, by Francis Crick [20]. Which passage they had to read depended on the group they were
assigned to: the anti-free will group read a text claiming that scientists now recognize that free will is
an illusion, while the control group read a passage from the same book that did not mention free will.
Participants were instructed that they had to answer two questions about the text at the end of the
experiment. This was to ensure that participants read the manipulation text carefully. The texts and
the questions are made available on OSF (https://osf.io/3nxpg/). We had to run the two groups
consecutively (first the control group; then the anti-free will group) due to technical restrictions by
Prolific to ensure that participants could not participate twice (i.e. once as part of the control group
and once as part of the anti-free will group).
In the third phase (the post-manipulation phase), participants again performed four blocks of the
Simon task with 96 trials each. When all blocks were completed, participants filled in the FWI and an
impulsivity questionnaire (UPPS-P short). The FWI (see https://osf.io/3nxpg/) consists of 15 Likert-
type items (scores from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) with three subscales (Free Will,
Determinism and Dualism/Anti-Reductionism). The impulsivity questionnaire was an addition, as
this project will be part of a larger individual-differences project across studies. We did not use the
UPPS-P data for this study.
Thus, the overall procedure is highly similar to the procedure used in the original study [6]. There are
only four notable procedural differences. First, this study was conducted online to reach a larger sample
size. To our knowledge, there are at least two published studies [25,30] which used the Crick text in a
single online procedure and both studies observed a difference between the anti-free will group and




5included these two studies and other unpublished studies to compare the Crick-text manipulation in
laboratory-based and online contexts. The meta-analysis found a small effect in the laboratory studies,
(g ¼ 0:21, s.e. = 0.04, p , 0:001, based on 25 effect sizes from 24 experiments), as well as a small effect
in the online studies (g ¼ 0:13, s.e. = 0.05, p , 0:012, based on 22 effect sizes from 20 experiments).
The numerical difference between laboratory-based and online studies did not reach significance
(p ¼ 0:21). We, therefore, assume that this first deviation from the original study protocol (i.e. online
instead of laboratory-based) did not affect the results negatively; instead, we assume it improved the
design as we were able to test a much larger (and potentially more heterogeneous) sample. Second,
we used the FWI instead of the FAD plus (which was used in the original study), because the FWI
might be more sensitive than the FAD plus [25]. For this reason, other follow-up studies have also
used this FWI. Third, our study consisted of only one session, whereas the original study [6] consisted
of two distinct test sessions that were separated by a week. However, we only had one test session for
practical reasons as testing up to 400 participants or more (depending on how many participants had
to be replaced) across two online sessions did not seem feasible. Because of this, we also decided to
drop the baseline FWI measurement. If we would have included a baseline FWI measurement, the
baseline and post-manipulation measurement of the FWI would have been separated by only 30 min,
making carry-over effects likely. However, note that our design was sufficiently powered to detect
between-subject differences in FWI scores (resulting from the experimental manipulation) [28]. Fourth,
we also decided to drop the PANAS, which was used in the original study to measure positive and
negative affect, as Rigoni et al. found no effect of reading the manipulation text on the PANAS scores.
2.5. Analyses
We conducted all analyses as they were conducted in the original study and in line with our
pre-registered data-analytic plan (https://osf.io/kmpdh). All data processing and analyses were
completed with R (v. 3.6.2) using the packages here (v. 0.1), ez (v. 4.4-0), Hmisc (v. 4.3-1), ggplot
(v. 3.2.1), doBy (v. 4.6-4.1), BF (v. 0.9.12-4.2) and tidyverse (v. 1.3.0) [31]. All R and JASP scripts of the
experiment (including pre-registered scripts and scripts for the additional, exploratory analyses) can
be found on OSF (https://osf.io/3nxpg/).
2.5.1. Data processing
For each trial type (post-correct versus post-error), we calculated how fast participants responded to the
stimulus (response time [RT]). RTs shorter than 100ms and longer than 1 s were not considered for the
analysis. Moreover, missing trials (due to online data collection) and the following trial were excluded as
we could not determine for the missing trials whether the responses were correct or not. The trial
exclusion criteria were determined before data collection and matched the exclusion criteria used by
Rigoni et al. [6]. The number of trials excluded depended on how we calculated PES.
We measured PES in two distinct ways: the traditional difference score (which was used in the
original study) and the Dutilh method (which is less biased by global fluctuations). First, we
calculated a difference score between RTs on trials following an error and RTs on trials following a
correct trial. In the original study, this (often-used) difference score is referred to as the ‘PES effect’.
Second, we measured PES as suggested by Dutilh et al. [27], focusing on ‘correct–correct–error–
correct’ trial sequences (figure 1). In such sequences, the trial before the error is a post-correct trial
and the trial after the error is a post-error trial. We calculated the difference between these trials for
each of these trial sequences and then calculated the mean difference score. This difference provides a
measure of PES that is no longer contaminated by global fluctuations [27].
2.5.2. Data analysis
The main analyses focused on PES as a function of the experimental free will manipulation. For the
Dutilh et al. [27] method, we used the PES measure as explained above and submitted it to an
ANOVA with test phase (baseline versus post-manipulation) as within-subject factor and group (anti-
free will versus control) as between-subject factor. In case of a significant interaction, we used paired
Bayesian t-tests to compare the PES difference across sessions between the groups in order to get an
analytical solution for the BF (figure 1).
For the traditional analyses of PES (as used in the original study as well), RTs and error rates were







average difference for Bayesian t-test
PESpre-manipulation
PES = diff post-correct – post-error 









post-manipulation) and previous trial (correct or error) as within-subject factors, and group as between-
subject factors. We used paired t-tests (frequentist and Bayesian equivalent) to measure the change of PES
across sessions within each group. For this, we calculated a difference score between trials following
errors and trials following correct responses and then the difference between the baseline and the
post-manipulation phase in this difference score for each group.
To check whether there were already differences between the groups in the baseline phase, we also
submitted the mean correct RTs and the mean error rate in the baseline phase to a mixed ANOVA
(frequentist and Bayesian equivalent) with congruency (congruent, incongruent) as within-subjects
factor and group (anti-free will, control) as between-subjects factor. Finally, for the extra manipulation
check, we ran a t-test (frequentist and Bayesian equivalent) for independent samples on the FWI
subscale scores to compare the score between the groups (anti-free will, control).
We also pre-registered an additional exploratory analysis concerning congruency as an additional factor.
However, after more consideration we came to the conclusion that there would be not enough trials for this
analysis. Therefore, in contradiction to the pre-registration,we did not perform this analysis. But as discussed
below, we did perform two different exploratory analyses (that were not pre-registered).
We report p-values and BFs. All tests (frequentist and Bayesian)were two-tailed. As this is a replication, a
one-tailed t-test might be viewed as more appropriate. However, we had concerns about the original (low)
sample size, and as such, deemed it possible that the effect could also go in the opposite direction in our
replication. Moreover, such a finding would still be theoretically meaningful. Therefore, we decided to use
two-tailed t-tests. For frequentist statistics, significance was determined at an alpha level of 0.05 (but with
correction for multiple comparisons). BFs in a Bayesian t-test (BF10) were calculated with the BF package v.
0.9.12-2 in R, and quantified the evidence for the alternative hypothesis against the null hypothesis. In
contrast to the pre-registration, in which we said we would perform all analyses in R, we used JASP (v.
0.13.1.0) [32] to perform the Bayesian ANOVA. We report the inclusion BF10 of the Bayesian ANOVAs
(calculated in JASP) in tables 1–7. The BF10 of the Bayesian t-tests (calculated in R) are reported in the main
text. An inclusion BF10 of B means the data are about B times more likely under the models that include
this effect, compared to the models that do not include this effect. Given the small sample size of the
original study, we assumed that the reported effect size was not a good estimate for the population effect
size. Therefore, we decided to use the default prior widths (the Cauchy prior width of 0.707) as defined by
the BF package in R and in JASP.3. Results
3.1. Belief in free will
We analysed the scores of the three subscales of the FWI separately. Note that high scores on the Free Will













































Figure 2. PES (in ms) calculated with the Dutilh et al. method and the traditional method of PES as a function of group and test
phase. The error bars reflect between-subject confidence interval.
Table 1. Inferential statistics of the Dutilh et al. [27] difference score.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 7965.04 0.16 0.69 0.00 0.143
test phase 1.00 398.00 2836.30 145.72 0.00 * 0.09 >100
group × test phase 1.00 398.00 2836.30 0.47 0.49 0.00 0.129





free will, whereas high scores on the Determinism subscale (five items) meant a low belief in free will. For
the manipulation check, we ran Welch’s t-tests for independent samples on the FWI subscale scores to
compare the score between the groups (anti-free will, control). For the Determinism subscale, the t-test
revealed a significant difference between the anti-free will group (M ¼ 3:75; s.d. = 1.15) and the control
group (M ¼ 3:52; s.d. = 1.12), t(397:74) ¼ 1:99, p ¼ 0:05, gav = 0.20. However, the corresponding BF was
indecisive, BF10 = 0.74. For the Dualism/Anti-Reductionism subscale, the t-test revealed a significant
difference between the anti-free will group (M ¼ 3:87; s.d. = 1.40) and the control group (M ¼ 4:33;
s.d. = 1.42), t(397:87) ¼ 3:27, p , 0:001, gav = 0.33. The corresponding BF showed strong evidence for
the alternative hypothesis, BF10 = 18.04. For the Free Will subscale the t-test revealed a significant
difference between the anti-free will group (M ¼ 4:25; s.d. = 1.18) and the control group (M ¼ 4:58;
s.d. = 1.20), t(397:95) ¼ 2:75, p , 0:001, gav = 0.28. The corresponding BF showed moderate evidence
for the alternative hypothesis, BF10 = 4.19.3.2. Post-error slowing in the Simon task
3.2.1. Dutilh et al. [27] method
We used the Dutilh et al. [27] difference score and submitted it to an ANOVA with test phase (baseline
versus post-manipulation) as within-subject factor and group (anti-free will versus control) as between-
subject factor. The difference scores are presented in figure 2 and the inferential statistics are presented in
table 1. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of test phase, indicating a larger difference score in
the baseline phase (M ¼ 123ms; s.d. = 78 ms) than in the post-manipulation phase (M ¼ 78ms; s.d. =
69 ms). The main effect of group, and the interaction between test phase and group, were not
significant. The independent Bayesian t-test to compare the PES differences across test phases between
the groups (figure 1), revealed substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, BF10 = 0.139. Thus, we





































Figure 3. RT and error rate in the traditional way of calculating PES as a function of previous trial, group and test phase. The error
bars reflect between-subject confidence interval.
Table 2. Inferential statistics of the RT data calculated with the traditional measurement of post-error slowing.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 13 320.40 5.28 0.02 * 0.01 1.794
test phase 1.00 398.00 1643.30 387.39 0.00 * 0.08 >100
previous trial 1.00 398.00 2971.57 843.04 0.00 * 0.25 >100
group × test phase 1.00 398.00 1643.30 0.39 0.53 0.00 0.092
group × previous trial 1.00 398.00 2971.57 0.20 0.65 0.00 0.090
test phase × previous trial 1.00 398.00 1064.56 104.81 0.00 * 0.01 >100
group × test phase ×
previous trial
1.00 398.00 1064.56 1.47 0.23 0.00 0.174






RTs and error rates were submitted to an ANOVAwith test phase (baseline versus post-manipulation) and
previous trial (correct versus error) as within-subjects factors, and group as between-subjects factor. PES
difference scores are shown in figure 2. For the RT, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group,
indicating shorter RTs for the anti-free will group (M ¼ 473ms; s.d. = 81 ms) compared to the control
group (M ¼ 486ms; s.d. = 83 ms). The main effect of test phase was also significant, indicating shorter RTs
in the post-manipulation phase (M ¼ 460ms; s.d. = 73 ms) than in the baseline phase (M ¼ 499ms; s.d. =
86 ms). The main effect of previous trial was also significant, indicating shorter RTs for trials following a
correct trial (M ¼ 440ms; s.d. = 51 ms) compared to trials following an error trial (M ¼ 519ms; s.d. =
89 ms), resulting in a general PES effect of 79 ms. The interaction between test phase and previous trial
was significant. Using the difference between trials following a correct trial and trials following an error
(PES effect; figure 2), a paired (Bayesian) t-test showed that the PES effect was larger in the baseline phase
(M ¼ 96ms; s.d. = 66 ms) than in the post-manipulation phase (M ¼ 62ms; s.d. = 60 ms), t(399) ¼ 10:23,
p , 0:001, BF10 > 100. All other interactions were not significant. For detailed inferential statistics, see
table 2 and for detailed descriptive data (figure 3).
For the error rates, the ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group. The main effect of test
phase was significant, indicating higher error rates in the post-manipulation phase (M ¼ 7:2%;
Table 4. Inferential statistics of the RT data the baseline phase.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 5006.86 8.32 0.00 * 0.02 8.092
congruency 1.00 398.00 144.29 1042.22 0.00 * 0.07 >100
group × congruency 1.00 398.00 144.29 0.62 0.43 0.00 0.133
Note: ges, generalized eta-squared measure of effect size.
Table 3. Inferential statistics of the error data calculated with the traditional measurement of post-error slowing.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 0.01 2.97 0.09 0.00 0.337
test phase 1.00 398.00 0.00 33.51 0.00 * 0.01 >100
previous trial 1.00 398.00 0.00 65.13 0.00 * 0.04 >100
group × test phase 1.00 398.00 0.00 0.17 0.68 0.00 0.103
group × previous trial 1.00 398.00 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.00 0.091
test phase × previous trial 1.00 398.00 0.00 1.87 0.17 0.00 0.170
group × test phase × previous trial 1.00 398.00 0.00 0.17 0.68 0.00 0.114





s.d.¼ 6:6%) than in the baseline phase (M ¼ 5:7%; s.d.¼ 6:3%). The main effect of previous trial was also
significant, indicating higher error rates for trials following an error trial (M ¼ 7:7%; s.d.¼ 8:5%)
compared to trials following a correct trial (M ¼ 5:1%; s.d.¼ 3:0%). All interactions were non-
significant. See table 3, for detailed inferential statistics.3.3. Baseline check
We submitted the mean correct RTs and the mean error rate in the baseline phase to a mixed ANOVAwith
congruency (congruent, incongruent) as within-subjects factor and group (anti-free will, control) as
between-subjects factor to check whether the groups already differed from each other before the
experimental manipulation. For the RT, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of group, indicating faster
RT for the anti-free will group (M ¼ 448ms; s.d. = 51 ms) compared to the control group (M ¼ 463ms;
s.d. = 54 ms). We tested whether this effect might be related to the exclusion of participants and
included all complete datasets. We also found this main effect of group in the analysis with all datasets
included, which indicates that this might be rather a false positive result than a sampling bias. The main
effect of congruency was also significant, indicating faster RT for congruent trials (M ¼ 442ms; s.d. =
51 ms) compared to the incongruent trials (M ¼ 469ms; s.d. = 52 ms). The interaction between group
and congruency was not significant. See table 4, for detailed inferential statistics.
For the error rates, the ANOVA also revealed a main effect of group, indicating higher error rate for
the anti-free will group (M ¼ 5:0%; s.d.¼ 3:8%) compared to the control group (M ¼ 4:3%; s.d. = 3.4%).
The main effect of congruency was also significant, indicating higher error rates for incongruent trials
(M ¼ 6:4%; s.d.¼ 4:0%) compared to the congruent trials (M ¼ 2:9%; s.d.¼ 2:0%). The interaction
between group and congruency was also significant, indicating a larger congruency effect
(incongreunt–congruent) in the manipulation group (3.9%) compared to the control group (3.1%)
(table 5).3.4. Not-pre-registered exploratory analyses
Originally, we pre-registered exploratory analyses to test the idea that post-error slowing is modulated by
congruency, performing additional analyses with congruency as a third within-subject factor. After some
consideration, we decided that there were not enough trials for these analyses including all within- and
Table 5. Inferential statistics of the error data the baseline phase.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 0.00 6.47 0.01 * 0.01 2.629
congruency 1.00 398.00 0.00 359.50 0.00 * 0.23 >100
group × congruency 1.00 398.00 0.00 4.34 0.04 * 0.00 0.826
Note: ges, generalized eta-squared measure of effect size.
Table 6. Inferential statistics of the exploratory RT analyses including congruency.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 8938.81 8.44 0.00 * 0.02 8.313
congruency 1.00 398.00 193.51 1365.13 0.00 * 0.06 >100
test phase 1.00 398.00 615.20 368.59 0.00 * 0.05 >100
group × congruency 1.00 398.00 193.51 1.38 0.24 0.00 0.121
group × test phase 1.00 398.00 615.20 0.31 0.58 0.00 0.113
congruency × test phase 1.00 398.00 64.43 18.43 0.00 * 0.00 0.590
group × congruency ×
test phase
1.00 398.00 64.43 0.13 0.71 0.00 0.081
Note: ges, generalized eta-squared measure of effect size.
Table 7. Inferential statistics of the exploratory error analyses including congruency.
effect DFn DFd MSE F p-value p , 0:05 ges BF10
group 1.00 398.00 0.00 6.15 0.01 * 0.01 2.173
congruency 1.00 398.00 0.00 445.52 0.00 * 0.21 >100
test phase 1.00 398.00 0.00 124.31 0.00 * 0.03 >100
group × congruency 1.00 398.00 0.00 2.16 0.14 0.00 0.547
group × test phase 1.00 398.00 0.00 0.07 0.80 0.00 0.086
congruency × test phase 1.00 398.00 0.00 3.03 0.08 0.00 0.141
group × congruency × test phase 1.00 398.00 0.00 2.51 0.11 0.00 0.150




10between-subject factors. Therefore, we conducted an additional, non-pre-registered 2 × 2 × 2 exploratory
analysis with the independent variables group (control versus anti-free will), test phase (baseline versus
post-manipulation) and congruency (congruent versus incongruent), omitting the within-subject factor
previous trial, to test whether the free-will manipulation has an influence on interference control
(measured via the congruency effects). Whereas all three main effects were significant in RT data as
well as error data, we only found an interaction between congruency and test phase in the RT data.
None of the interactions with group reached significance (see tables 6 and 7 for detailed inferential
statistics and see figure 4 for descriptive data).
Originally, we pre-registered the inclusion of participants who either answered both yes/no questions
about the manipulation text correctly at the end of the experiment, or read the text for at least 45 s. More
precisely, according to the pre-registration only participants that failed both attention checks were
excluded. However, even without reading the text, there is a 25% chance that both questions are
answered correctly. In the main analyses, we included 34 participants (23 in the control group and 11
in the anti-free will group) who took less than 45 s to read the text. These may not have read the text





































Figure 4. RT (in ms) and error rates (in proportion) as a function of congruency and group in the baseline phase and in the post-




11analyses again but excluded these ‘fast readers’. The analyses revealed the same effects as the pre-
registered analyses in the behavioural data, and there were no meaningful changes in inferential
statistics. See the OSF repository (https://osf.io/3nxpg/) for more detailed information. By contrast,
the analysis of the questionnaire data was affected. In the frequentist analyses, all group differences
remained significant (all ps , 0:05), but the BFs changed more substantially. The BF for the
Determinism subscale remained inconclusive BF10 = 0.88, whereas the BF for the Dualism subscale
decreased and only showed moderate evidence for the alternative hypothesis, BF10 = 6.39. The BF for
the Free Will subscale also decreased, showing only anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis,
BF10 = 2.18.4. General discussion
In this study, we attempted to replicate the influence of free will beliefs on cognitive control. Rigoni et al.
[6] found that after reading an ‘anti-free will text’, participants’ belief in free will was reduced, and they
showed less slowing after an error (an often-used behavioural marker of cognitive-control adjustment). In
the anti-free will group, reduction in free-will beliefs also correlated with a reduction in PES. Based on
these findings, the authors concluded that weakening beliefs in free will can have an impact on
cognitive control (and behaviour more generally). Here, we attempted to replicate their findings. To
this end, we used the same Simon task as the original study to measure PES. We also used the Crick
[20] text to manipulate the participants’ belief in free will. The FWI questionnaire was included as an
independent manipulation check. We found an influence of the manipulation on the FWI subscales,
with a similar effect size as in the original study. The Cohen’s d in our study ranged from 0.20 to 0.33
for the different subscales; in the original study, the effect size of the aggregated score of the FAD
plus was Cohen’s d = 0.22. This suggests that the manipulation worked equally well in both studies.
Crucially, we failed to replicate the finding that PES in a Simon task was reduced when belief in free
will is mitigated. Additional analyses also indicated that the Crick manipulation did not influence
behavioural performance. Thus, our results suggest that reduced belief in free will has no impact on
behavioural performance after all.
It could be argued that we did not find an effect of free will beliefs on PES because the inter-trial
interval (ITI) in our task was too short. As noted in the Introduction, alternative accounts of PES have
been proposed. Specifically, it has been argued that errors may orient attention away from the main




12an initial phase. Only when the ITI is long enough, control adjustments would contribute to the slowing.
The higher error rates found after incorrect trials (see the Traditional analyses section) are consistent with
this idea. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the same ITI was used in the original study of Rigoni et al.
[6], and all behavioural measures were similar (i.e. overall RTs and error rates were comparable across
studies). Thus, if PES in the present study was due to attentional reorienting (rather than control
adjustments), then this was most likely also the case in the original study. Second, even a reorienting
account could predict reduced PES when beliefs in free will are reduced. Specifically, the orienting
account predicts that slowing is observed after salient events. But when beliefs in free will are
reduced, participants would generally feel less responsible for the outcome of a trial. Consequently,
errors would become less salient and PES should be reduced. Thus, it can be argued that PES should
be reduced, regardless of the ITI and the relative contribution of reorienting and cognitive-control
adjustments to the effect. Third, the exploratory analyses revealed that the congruency effect, which
has been used as a marker of cognitive control as well, was similarly not influenced by the free will
manipulation. Finally (and perhaps most importantly), a possible alternative interpretation of PES
does not alter the observation that we were not able to replicate the effect of the experimental
manipulation on PES and behavioural performance in the first place (despite relying on the same design).
Thus, we can conclude that our findings are not consistent with the original study, which supported
an influence of free will manipulations on a behavioural measure indexing PES. Our findings are aligned
with a recent study which similarly found altered belief in free will in judges after reading the Crick text,
but no influence on their subsequent sentencing (i.e. behaviour) [33]. Yet, some recent studies even failed
to show an effect on self-reported measures. Several replication attempts investigating the influence of
belief in free will on cheating behaviour did not find any significant difference between the anti-free
will group and the control group, neither in the self-reported belief in free will measure, nor in the
actual cheating behaviour [34,35]. Generally, it seems that if the free-will manipulation ‘works’, its
effect is restricted to self-reported beliefs and does not influence actual behaviour.5. Conclusion
In summary, in this high-powered replication attempt, we were able to find a difference between the anti-
free will group and the control group on the questionnaire scores, showing reduced belief in free will in the
anti-free will group. This is in line with the original study and a recent meta-analysis [23]. However, we
were not able to reproduce the finding that reduced belief in free will leads to reduced PES. Even
though we did not reach our aimed BF of larger than 10 or smaller than 0.1, our BF revealed substantial
evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. We, therefore, were not able to replicate the central finding
that the Crick manipulation of belief in free will influences post-error adjustment behaviour.
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